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Abstract 
This article charts the long-term development of seigneurial governance within the 
principality of Guelders in the Low Countries. Proceeding from four quantitative cross-
sections (c. 1325, 1475, 1540, 1570) of seigneurial lordships, the conclusion is that 
seigneurial governance remained stable in late medieval Guelders. The central argument is 
that this persistence of seigneurial governance was an effect of active collaboration 
between princely administrations, lords, and local communities. Together, the princely 
government and seigneuries of Guelders formed an integrated, yet polycentric, state. The 
article thereby challenges the narrative of progressive state centralisation that 
predominates in the historiography of pre-modern state formation.   
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Seigneurial governance and the state in late medieval Guelders (14th – 16th century)  
 
I. Introduction 
There has been no shortage of studies on the interaction between power elites and the 
emergence of secular government in pre-modern Europe. Ever since the 1980s and 1990s, 
historians have begun to nuance what had become the traditional view: that the persistence 
of noble warfare and independent seigneurial law courts in the medieval period were 
counterproductive to the centralised power of the state and its associated institutions.1 The 
main contribution of the revisionist scholarship of the end of the twentieth century was its 
departure from this emphasis on absolute power and institutional development, focusing 
instead on the social aspects of pre-modern politics. Historians began to argue that 
European states actually arose in a constant dialogue with their social elites.2 Jeremy Black 
has characterised this revisionism as ‘an interpretation centred on crown-élite consensus, in 
which the crucial political question becomes that of the crown issuing orders that it knows 
will meet with a ready response, in large part because it is reacting to élite views’.3 
 So far, this reinterpretation revolving around state-elite cooperation has primarily 
extended to the development of fiscal and military apparatuses, which are widely 
recognised as two crucial pillars in the process of state formation.4 But a vital third pillar, 
governance, or the practical application of political power and juridical authority, remains 
underexamined. For the late medieval and early modern periods, the key concept in this 
regard is lordship. Rightly called ‘the “master noun” in the medieval lexicon of power’, 
lordship may refer to a varied range of power relations. However, within that spectrum, the 
seigneurial lordship, or the seigneurie, forms a concrete institutional benchmark. This paper 
chiefly addresses that institution, rather than the more versatile relational components of 
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lordship.5 Thus, the focus is not so much on normative aspects of governance, or the 
manner of governing itself, but on the institutional outlines of government. The central 
institution in this study, the seigneurial lordship, arose in slightly different forms throughout 
Europe in the medieval period. It can be broadly defined as the private ownership of public 
authority; embodied by the lord’s legal court.6 The seigneurial exercise of justice has long 
been considered problematic to state formation because most historians adopt versions of 
Max Weber’s 1919 definition of the modern state as the organisation with a ‘monopoly’ on 
the legitimate use of force.7 The ‘private’ law courts of seigneuries would have detracted 
from this exclusive right to coercion. Several more recent studies about late medieval state 
formation still support this view, arguing that ‘noble justice was in retreat as princely 
institutions drew business out of private courts and noblemen’s role in those centralising 
tribunals simultaneously declined’.8 By that rationale, one would expect falling numbers of 
seigneurial lordships towards the end of the middle ages. However, these claims about the 
erosion of justice in seigneurial courts are not substantiated by empirical evidence.  
What is more, a growing number of studies show that the relationship between 
seigneurial governance and the pre-modern state could actually be characterised by 
collaboration and mutual respect. According to this reinterpretation, late medieval and early 
modern monarchies persistently outsourced key aspects of governance (taxation, justice, 
keeping the peace) to the level of the seigneurie and lordly law court. Much of this 
scholarship is focused on the kingdom of France, following on from Pierre Charbonnier’s 
1980s and 1990s seminal works on the Basse-Auvergne.9 More recently, historians have 
found the same pattern in other French regions such as Languedoc and early modern 
Normandy.10 But this was not a distinctly French phenomenon: in her 2016 book The shape 
of the state, Alice Taylor demonstrates that a similar kind of cooperation existed in the high 
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medieval kingdom of Scotland. According to Taylor, ‘the growth of governmental 
institutions’ in Scotland was buttressed by aristocratic power and did not take form in 
opposition to ‘a private sphere, occupied by lordship’.11 
These studies have firmly challenged and nuanced the centralisation paradigm. Yet 
there have been few attempts to quantify the long-term evolution of aristocratic institutions 
in relation to the expanding state. This hiatus applies especially to the late medieval German 
Empire, including the larger part of the Low Countries. A complicating factor here is the 
Empire’s polycentric nature: despite its official royal or imperial core, in practice, 
sovereignty was divided between the various principalities. This has largely forestalled their 
analysis as medieval ‘states’.12 However, a promising case in this regard is the Low 
Countries, which covered parts of present-day Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and 
Germany. The political history of the Low Countries provides a useful contrast to the 
trajectories of ‘strong’ European states with clear medieval antecedents, such as the 
kingdoms of England and France.13 Although progressively unified under the rule of the 
dukes of Burgundy during the fifteenth century, the various Netherlandish principalities 
retained much of their own political traditions and institutional structures. Accordingly, 
some historians have labelled the political system of the late medieval Low Countries a 
‘composite monarchy’, whereas others consider it a mere subsection of the ‘Great Seigniory 
of Burgundy’, that is, a short-lived polity cobbled together from French and German 
principalities that never gained political coherence.14 
The present article offers a contribution to this debate through a quantitative 
analysis of the seigneuries within one specific principality of the Low Countries in the period 
between 1325 and 1570. At this point, it is important to note that the Low Countries, like 
the German Empire more generally, was not as a rule completely covered by seigneuries. 
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This marks a contrast with regions like late medieval France or Norman England, which were 
blanketed with seigneuries (France) or manors (England).15 By 1300, large stretches of the 
Netherlandish countryside were in fact governed by communities of free peasants, which 
recognised no lord beyond the regional prince. These non-seigneurial localities existed 
alongside the seigneuries – where, incidentally, the majority of inhabitants were also legally 
free, and not of villein or serf status as was common in England – and the relatively 
numerous, enfranchised urban centres.16 Because of this variety, charting the seigneuries is 
a crucial first step towards understanding the relationship between seigneurial and other 
forms of governance in the Low Countries. The long-term evolution of this relationship is 
relevant, because even though the lordship was an institutional container of power – which 
may suggest immutability – it still constituted a power relation. Most seigneuries were held 
in fief from princes, who could occasionally alter the conditions of infeudation. The lords 
and ladies themselves had an analogous relationship with their own fief-holders, seigneurial 
officers and residents. Therefore, it is far from certain that a given lordship came with the 
same powers of governance in 1325 as it did in 1570. 
The case study that will be central to the analysis is the principality of Guelders, in 
the north-eastern part of the Low Countries (Figure 1). The extant records relating to the 
seigneuries of Guelders is exceptionally rich, up to the point that they allow a reconstruction 
of the entire seigneurial landscape and its evolution between c. 1325 and c. 1570. The 
foundation for this reconstruction derives from contemporary registers kept by the princely 
administration of Guelders, which list all known fief-holders at a particular moment in time. 
These registers enable ‘snapshot’ surveys of the number of seigneuries in four sample years 
(c. 1325, c. 1475, c. 1540, c. 1570), which in turn allow us to infer quantitative developments 
in the interim.17 
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Guelders is a prime example of the political polycentrism characteristic of the late 
medieval Low Countries. The principality may therefore serve as a microcosm of the 
German Empire in general, and concomitantly provides an ideal point of comparison with 
better-known regions in France and the British Isles. That said, even within the Low 
Countries, the different principalities show marked variation in their development of 
governmental institutions. Therefore, the seigneurial evolution in Guelders cannot be 
automatically projected onto other regions such as the county of Flanders, the county of 
Holland, or the duchy of Brabant. Guelders is simply the first Netherlandish region to be 
studied in this way, but the expectation is that future research could – and should – 
determine to what extent this principality’s late medieval seigneurial development 
compared to other regions in the Low Countries.18 Still, as an extreme example of 
Netherlandish governmental polycentrism, Guelders is ideally suited to foreground such an 
analysis of the relationship between aristocratic power and political institutionalisation in 
the late medieval Low Countries – even while it is often left out of general political histories 
of the Low Countries.19  
The shadow of Max Weber looms large in the historiography on late medieval 
Guelders. Most specialists have been hesitant to call the principality a state, precisely 
because of the persistence of decentral political units such as seigneurial lordships.20 In 
what follows, I develop a different perspective, proceeding from the hypothesis that 
seigneurial governance was not necessarily inimical to princely power or to the effective 
maintenance of law and order.21 In order to test this hypothesis, the present article departs 
from a (partly comparative) study of two sub-regions within the principality of Guelders. The 
first of these areas, the so-called ‘Quarter’ (Kwartier) of Arnhem, has been noted for its 
predominance of self-governed peasant communities – where the only lord was the remote 
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prince of Guelders – whereas historians have emphasised the prevalence of elite power in 
the second sub-region, the Quarter of Nijmegen.22 One objective of this study is to 
determine whether the number of lordships in these areas conforms to the same sub-
regional divergence. Yet the underlying goal is to examine the impact of seigneurial law 
courts on princely authority and on the performance of the political system.  
To that end, the second section of this article offers a brief introduction to the 
political landscape of late medieval Guelders, before presenting the results of the 
quantitative survey of seigneuries in the two sub-regions. As will become clear, the Quarter 
of Nijmegen had a far higher number of these seigneurial jurisdictions than the Quarter of 
Arnhem. On the whole, though, the number of lordships in both regions remained 
remarkably stable between the early fourteenth and later sixteenth century. What is more, 
the breadth of lordships’ powers of jurisdictions evinces the same pattern of stability, even 
showing signs of increasing strength. Sections three and four sketch the possible 
explanations for this continuity, first from the perspective of lords and seigneurial 
communities, and secondly from the viewpoint of the princely administration of Guelders. 
Finally, the conclusion explores some of the broader implications of this case-study for how 
we might conceptualise state formation in the context of late medieval Europe in general. 
 
II. Stability of seigneurial governance, c. 1325 – c. 1570 
While technically part of the German Empire, Guelders was an independent principality for 
much of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The power base of its princes stemmed from 
a collection of Carolingian counties spread around the various corners of what would later 
become Guelders’s four ‘Quarters’ (Kwartieren). Around 1100, the core region still lay in the 
area around the town of Gelre (Geldern), after which the comital dynasty would come to 
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style itself. But in the course of the next two centuries, the counts of Guelders managed to 
extend their influence over the cities of Zutphen, Nijmegen, Roermond, Arnhem, and their 
hinterlands. In the fifteenth century, these cities became the capitals of synonymous 
Quarters, with each Quarter subdivided into several shires (ambten) (Figure 1). By the early 
fourteenth century, Guelders had taken the physical shape it would more or less retain until 
the later sixteenth century, even as the emperor raised its status from a county to a duchy 
in 1339.23 However, the principality’s political ties to the Empire declined over time. The de 
facto independence was consolidated in 1423, when Emperor Sigismund (1411-1437) put 
forth a successor to the empty ducal seat but the cities and nobility of Guelders supported a 
rival claimant from the House of Egmont. The latter candidate ended up duke, despite the 
Empire’s refusal to recognise the Egmont claim as legitimate. This remained the official 
imperial stance until 1538.24  
 The princes’ fragile legitimacy contributed to a polycentric political system with a 
prominent role for the towns and seigneurial lords of Guelders. Neither a brief takeover by 
the Valois Dukes of Burgundy (1473-1477) nor Guelders’s incorporation into the Habsburg 
Netherlands (1543-1581) brought significant change in this regard. To be sure, these foreign 
administrations sped up the process of political institutionalisation, especially through the 
growing role of the ducal Chamber of Accounts (Rekenkamer) and the central Court of 
Guelders (Hof van Gelre en Zutphen).25 But the urban and rural elites had secured privileges 
in the fifteenth century that secured their autonomy in the long term. Among other things, 
the duke could not institute direct taxes without the consent of the Estates assemblies, 
which were composed of representatives of the Cities (Steden), Knighthood (Ridderschap) 
and Lords-Banneret (Bannerheren). This meant that the aristocracy was represented by two 
out of three Estates – a contrast with most other Netherlandish regions (e.g. Flanders, 
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Brabant), where the clergy was also represented. Furthermore, although the Knighthood 
officially consisted of armigerous men of established noble lineage, these men often 
possessed a seigneurie, while each Lord-Banneret also held at least one lordship with its 
own seigneurial tribunal.26 In other words, the lords of Guelders took a prominent part in 
duchy-wide politics through their strong presence at these assemblies, as well as at the 
Ducal Council.27  
However, the size and scope of seigneurial jurisdictions in Guelders could vary 
considerably from one case to the next. The most powerful seigneuries were those with 
their own criminal courts: so-called ‘high lordships’ (hoge heerlijkheden).28 All sanctions fell 
within the remit of these seigneuries, including torture and capital punishment.29 This raised 
high lordships above the so-called ‘day-to-day lordships’ (dagelijkse heerlijkheden). In the 
latter, adjudications of the lord concerned ‘daily’ affairs like financial malpractice, local 
water management and the wounding of livestock. But day-to-day lords shared jurisdiction 
over non-lethal violence (e.g. fist fights) with the regional princely officer.30 The geographic 
range of these seigneurial jurisdictions is difficult to quantify because contemporary 
descriptions tend to omit precise boundaries. For the most part, however, seigneurial 
jurisdictions extended to one or a few villages, and the number of people subjected to their 
authority differed accordingly. So, in 1569, the lord of Poederoijen reported to the ducal 
administration that his seigneurie counted around 200 parishioners, which he considered ‘a 
very small number’.31 Estimates based on hearth counts of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries nonetheless suggest that populations of a few hundred people were fairly typical 
for the seigneuries of Guelders.32  
 The political landscape of Guelders was a mixture of these seigneuries, of semi-
autonomous towns, and of jurisdictions that were governed by local village officers but that 
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were overseen by one ducal ‘reeve’ (ambtman) who was in charge of all such villages in the 
entire shire (ambacht). In terms of their governmental powers and function, the seigneuries 
of Guelders were therefore largely analogous with these shires, with two important 
distinctions: firstly, instead of a ducal reeve, the chief governmental agent in the seigneurie 
was the lord or lady, who was not elected by the prince (at least not in that crude sense); 
secondly, shires proper tended to have a larger area of jurisdiction that usually included 
over a dozen villages, whereas seigneurial jurisdiction mostly extended to only one or a few 
localities – as illustrated by the example of Poederoijen in 1569 (see above). Because of this, 
strictly in terms of their physical range and demographic scope, seigneuries were more akin 
to villages than shires. In Guelders, as in the Low Countries more generally, these village 
communities – be they seigneurial or not – enjoyed a relatively high degree of self-
governance from around 1300 onwards. As a rule, the village’s bench of aldermen had the 
authority to oversee civil suits, while criminal justice rested either with the ducal reeve or 
with the lord and his officers.33 In the high lordship of Oudewaard in the Quarter of 
Nijmegen, for example, the seigneurial seneschal (drost) and aldermen upheld justice and 
collected taxes which ended up in the lord’s treasury. The duke had little to no direct power 
of governance in localities like this one. But directly bordering on this seigneurie was the 
village of Kesteren, which was not held by a local lord. In this jurisdiction, the reeve of 
Neder-Betuwe collected direct taxes (schattinge) at the behest of the duke and oversaw 
legal hearings, as well as appeals for the wider region.34  
 The quantitative evolution of Guelders’s seigneuries suggests a stable coexistence of 
seigneurial institutions and the princely government from the early fourteenth to the later 
sixteenth century. This result is based on four cross-sections (c. 1325, c. 1475, c. 1540, c. 
1570) of seigneurial jurisdictions in the Quarters of Nijmegen and Arnhem (Table 1). The 
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selection of these sample years has been motivated by their states of documentation: they 
coincide with the princely administration’s periodic overviews of the region’s fief-holders. 
The Feudal Chamber (Leenkamer) of Guelders generally updated this documentation 
whenever a new ruler succeeded to the principality. As a consequence, regime changes tend 
to coincide with particularly rich records on Guelders’s seigneuries, even more so when the 
new ruling administrations was ‘foreign’, as with the Burgundian and Habsburg takeovers of 
1473 and 1543. The bulk of the research for this article is based on four such registers of 
around 100 folios each, drafted by the princely administration’s ‘feudal stadtholders’ 
(leenstadhouders) and preserved in nos. 102 (c. 1326), 116 (1473-74), 14G (1538), and 22L 
(1569) of the Feudal Chamber of Guelders – a subsection of the Ducal Archives kept in the 
Dutch city of Arnhem (see also Table 1). As opposed to other serial feudal records that show 
a tendency to simply reproduce the names of fief-holders listed in earlier registers, it is clear 
that these tomes were consistently updated.35 Of course, most of these overviews only 
contain the feudal lordships, and only those held from the princes of Guelders themselves. 
Therefore, seigneurial jurisdictions held in fief from foreign princes, along with ‘allodial’ 
courts (in seigneuries without a feudal overlord), are generally omitted from these 
records.36 Also, the fourteenth-century overview, which constitutes the first top-down 
attempt by the prince to record the current fief-holders of Guelders, is definitely 
incomplete.37 These problems have been countered by supplementing the Feudal 
Chamber’s registers with separate infeudation letters produced by the counts and dukes of 
Guelders, as well as charters and registers kept by foreign administrations – approximately 
60 additional original documents in total. To name one example, the high lordship of 
Homoet in the shire of Over-Betuwe was a fief of the lords of Oosterhout in the duchy of 
Brabant before becoming an allod of the lords of Bergh in 1486. As a consequence, it does 
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not feature in the records of Guelders’s Feudal Chamber. Nonetheless, its status can be 
followed throughout the research period through charters preserved in the archives of the 
lords of Bergh.38 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
The resultant survey reveals that, taken as a whole, the number of seigneuries in the 
Quarters of Nijmegen and Arnhem remained more or less stable between 1325 and 1570 
(Table 1). There are slight variations throughout the years, but these are primarily caused by 
gaps in the source material – especially for the fourteenth-century sample year. Note, 
however, that continuity in the number of lordships does not always mean that it was the 
same seigneurial courts that persisted alongside princely authority. For example, in 1342, 
the ducal administration permanently absorbed the village of Velp in the shire of 
Veluwezoom, which had been a high lordship up until then. Numerically, this balanced out 
in the long term (1325-1570), but that is because Duke Charles of Egmont turned another 
jurisdiction in the area – the high lordship of Roozendaal – into a fief in 1516.39 But these 
are exceptions. The overall pattern is clearly one of seigneurial stability. 
 Strikingly, this stability holds true especially for lordships with high justice. These 
exalted seigneurial jurisdictions actually increased in number from the later fifteenth 
century onwards. This belies older interpretations of state formation in which princely 
administrations are thought to have developed a monopoly on legitimate violence. 
According to that view, the progressive political institutionalisation of Guelders, especially 
from the Burgundian interregnum onwards, should have gone hand-in-glove with a decline 
in the number of seigneurial courts (with their own ‘license to kill’). This was far from the 
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case, however. In the decades before and after 1500, the ducal administration even raised 
the number of seigneuries with high justice in Guelders, either by creating new jurisdictions 
or by expanding the juridical license of existent lordships. The pattern is most clearly visible 
in the Quarter of Nijmegen, where Duke Charles of Egmont (1492-1538) augmented the 
prerogatives of the seigneuries of Dalem (1505), Doornik (1507), Gendt (1506), 
Waardenburg (1504) and Zoelen (1506), all within the first decade of the sixteenth 
century.40 This phenomenon was by no means exclusive to Guelders, but rather a common 
strategy among Netherlandish princes who sought to consolidate their alliances with 
powerful aristocrats.41 
Of course, the persistence of these seigneurial institutions does not necessarily imply 
a stability of governance. Another way to measure the continuity of the seigneurial system 
is to look at who possessed these lordships. Now, it is well known that the late medieval 
aristocracy in general had a high rate of turnover, especially when studied over longer 
periods of time. In the county of Flanders, also a Netherlandish principality, only around 42 
per cent of the 228 noble lineages that had been active in the second half of the fourteenth 
century persisted up until the turn of the sixteenth century – even while the total number of 
active families remained roughly the same.42 In a similar vein, most historians hold that the 
seigneuries of the late medieval Low Countries, and of the Burgundian power zone more 
generally, were gradually appropriated by an ever-smaller group of powerful families. For 
example, Raymond Van Uytven has demonstrated that a sample of 55 lordships in the duchy 
of Brabant that were held by 55 lords in 1415, were held by 44 lords in 1490, by 36 in 1525, 
and had come to be concentrated in the hands of only 33 lords in 1565.43 
 




On the one hand, late medieval Guelders fits into this pattern to some extent, with a 
slight concentration of seigneurial estates in the hands of a select number of families (Table 
2.a). On the other hand, the evidence does not really support a pattern where a few 
powerful individuals amassed several of these jurisdictions: with a few exceptions, even by 
1570, most lords held only a single seigneurie.44 The records further reveal a degree of long-
term stability of ruling seigneurial families in Guelders.45 Looking at the persistence of 
members of the same lineages as lords of a given seigneurial jurisdiction in between the 
best-documented sample years, 1475 and 1570, it becomes clear that c. 44 per cent of the 
seigneuries continued to be governed by the same family over the course of almost a 
century (Table 2.b). This is reminiscent of what Pierre Charbonnier found for the Basse-
Auvergne, where around 45 per cent of 100 seigneuries were held by the same families in 
the early fifteenth century as they had been in the early fourteenth, and 51 per cent (of 158 
seigneuries) were still ruled by the same family in 1587 as they had been in 1488.46 In fact, 
these turnover rates of seigneurial families roughly correspond to the rate of extinction 
Frederik Buylaert found through a detailed study of the noble lineages in the county of 
Flanders (see above). As the seigneurial families of Guelders also predominantly stemmed 
from the duchy itself, we may tentatively conclude that there was a relatively high degree of 
dynastic continuity in the region’s seigneurial system. In that respect, Guelders may have 
differed from those areas of the Low Countries where the influence of the Burgundians (and 
later the Habsburgs) was more pronounced, as these show signs of the emergence of an 
overarching ‘state nobility’ from the second half of the fifteenth century onwards. This does 
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That said, the survey for Guelders does reveal an uneven spatial distribution of 
seigneuries between the studied Quarters, which is a warning against projecting subregional 
trends in the seigneurial landscape onto polities as a whole. Based on Guelders’s political 
sub-division into Quarters, the Nijmegen district emerges as far more lordship-dense than 
the Arnhem region (Figure 1). At its peak, the Quarter of Nijmegen (c. 1300 km2) counted 
around 60 seigneurial courts, more than half of which had powers of high justice. In fact, the 
area counted more high lordships than any other in Guelders.48 By contrast, the Quarter of 
Arnhem (c. 3000 km2) continuously had fewer than 10 seigneuries, only 3 of which had high 
jurisdiction (Doorwerth, Rosande and Roozendaal).49  
This subregional variation is not altogether surprising when viewed from an 
environmental and socioeconomic perspective. Bas van Bavel has argued that subregional 
variations in the landscape led to diverse economic trajectories in different parts of the Low 
Countries between the early middle ages and early modern period.50 Guelders was no 
exception in this regard. The rivers Meuse, Rhine and Waal created fertile soils that led to a 
flourishing of agriculture in the Nijmegen region. The landscape of the Arnhem Quarter, by 
contrast, was far less suitable for arable production because the larger part of the 
countryside was dominated by sloping hills and sand drifts. These natural factors also meant 
that Nijmegen’s rural hinterland was more densely populated than the Arnhem region. 
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the average population density in the 
countryside of the Quarter of Arnhem hovered around 11 inhabitants per km2, whereas the 
rural part of Nijmegen’s Quarter had already counted more than 25 per km2 in 1369.51 The 
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more fertile environment and greater concentration of people created better opportunities 
for manorial surplus extraction in the Nijmegen area during the high medieval period. This is 
implicitly corroborated by the sparse number of seigneuries in the Arnhem Quarter, most of 
which were located in fertile areas bordering on waterways (Figure 1).52 
The demographic contrast between the two Quarters can further be inferred from 
their total number of settlements: the Nijmegen district counted more than twice as many 
parishes as the Arnhem region (Table 1). Even allowing for this difference, however, the 
proportion of seigneurial communities was still far higher in the Quarter of Nijmegen than in 
the Quarter of Arnhem. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, when reliable overviews 
of the number of localities (kerspels) per shire become available, the proportion of 
seigneurial localities in the former Quarter was 48 per cent – ranging from 39 per cent in 
Tielerwaard to 73 per cent in Bommelerwaard. In the Arnhem region, only 21 per cent of all 
rural parishes was (partly) ruled by a local lord. 
Notwithstanding these subregional differences, the overall pattern in both Quarters 
nevertheless reveals a long-term stability in the number of seigneuries and ruling families, 
and, by implication, a stability of seigneurial governance. The quantitative evidence leaves 
little doubt that this institutional benchmark of lordship persisted in Guelders for the 
duration of the research period. So, even while Guelders witnessed a progressive political 
institutionalisation from the fifteenth century onwards, seigneurial courts apparently 
continued to play a prominent role in governing its rural populace.  
 
III. The seigneurie from the perspective of lords and local communities 
The persistence of seigneuries in Guelders between 1325 and 1570 suggests an alternative 
path of state formation to the dominant narrative of progressive governmental 
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centralisation. Clearly, the statement that ‘princely institutions drew business out of private 
courts’ does not hold unequivocally for this Netherlandish principality.53 This raises the 
question how and why seigneurial institutions of governance continued to define the 
political status quo for such a long time; that is, within this specific part of the Low 
Countries, but the question has a broader relevance, as earlier studies on Scotland and 
several French regions have shown similar patterns. To address this issue, the next two 
sections will discuss the function of the seigneurie in Guelders’s political system from the 
perspectives of different political actors, as a means to uncover the institution’s lasting 
raison d’être. As will become clear, seigneurial lordships continued to play an important role 
in governance for three interrelated reasons: first, their legitimacy in the eyes of the various 
parties involved; secondly, their familiarity to those same parties; and thirdly, the relative 
accessibility of seigneurial offices to the inhabitants, which facilitated the employment of 
local expertise.  
First of all, from the perspective of the lords and ladies themselves, the exercise of 
seigneurial justice was a fundamental aspect of their social status. Lordship, after all, 
entailed a formal license to rule over others. Throughout the late medieval Low Countries, 
the possession of a seigneurie with high justice was also one of the few guarantees of 
membership to the regional nobility.54 And so, despite its relatively high maintenance cost, 
the right to a seigneurial tribunal remained a desired privilege in Guelders.55 The clear 
stability in the survey bears this out, for one thing. For another, the desirability of semi-
independent justice is supported by anecdotal evidence. The lords and ladies of 
Waardenburg in the shire of Tielerwaard, for instance, fought a protracted legal battle 
(1538-1570) before the Court of Guelders to secure title to their own seigneurial tribunal. 
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They were almost certainly motivated by status concerns, because these particular lords 
could offer few concrete examples of having exercised criminal justice in practice.56  
Thus, seigneurial lords and ladies derived their exalted social status from their 
position as rulers over local subjects. At the same time, the seigneurie encompassed a 
contractual relationship between these lords and their subjects, with the potential to 
benefit both sides. From the point of view of local communities, this contractual basis of 
rule was useful because it offered protection in several ways. In medieval political ideology, 
lords and ladies were actually obliged to protect their communities in order to retain a 
legitimate claim to their jurisdictions. The very obedience of subjects was conditional upon 
the lords’ compliance to the ideology of ‘Good Lordship’.57 Conforming to the precepts of 
this ideal was to protect the interests of the seigneurial community in a general sense. So, a 
popular song of 1450, about the pilgrimage of three Netherlandish lords to the Holy Land, 
admonished these lords to use their power for the protection of merchants, widows and 
orphans. The lord of Batenburg in the shire of Meuse and Waal was one of the protagonists 
of this song. Therefore, the song’s popularity probably boosted the status of subsequent 
lords and ladies of Batenburg. But at the same time, the song served as a constant reminder 
of these lords’ obligations to their subjects.58 Indeed, there are various examples of late 
medieval lords who guarded the commercial interests of resident craft guilds and trade 
organisations.59  
This does not mean that seigneurial governments were categorically more 
benevolent to their subjects than officers appointed by the princes of Guelders, and the 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century legal records also show examples of lords abusing their 
powers.60 However, seigneurial communities specifically benefited from the contractual 
relationship embodied by the seigneurie because their lord or lady could be called upon to 
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protect their formal privileges. In 1568, for instance, the lord of Gendt submitted an official 
protest to the Court of Guelders to absolve his subjects from a financial contribution to the 
fortifications of the city of Arnhem.61 Other examples relate to lords’ formal prerogative and 
duty to police their own subjects. As the Habsburg rulers began to clamp down on the 
upsurge of Protestantism in the Low Countries in the mid-sixteenth century, certain lords 
interfered on behalf of their dependents, many of whom nurtured Protestant sentiments. 
So, in 1569, the lord of Poederoijen assured the Habsburg administration that his subjects 
had always followed the statutes and ordonnances of the Roman Church. The lady of 
Batenburg went one step further and actively blocked the Habsburg repression of 
Protestants in her lordship in 1566.62 Thus, lords could act as powerful mediators, 
occasionally even challenging the princely government itself. To be sure, the precepts of 
Good Lordship applied as much to princes and kings as they did to seigneurial lords.63 In 
fact, the ‘violation of lordly values’ was a central accusation levelled against King Philip II of 
Spain in the Act of Abjuration, signed by the Estates of several Netherlandish provinces – 
including Guelders – in 1581, marking the beginning of the end of Habsburg rule in these 
provinces.64 But late medieval subjects probably had a less palpable experience of their 
contractual relationship with far-flung princes than with their local lord or lady. 
 Indeed, from the perspective of local residents, the legitimacy of the seigneurie was 
further bolstered by its familiarity. As lords maintained bonds with the princely dynasty, so 
local fief-holders and prominent landowners had personal ties with the lord and his 
officers.65 Because of this, the seigneurie was at once more familiar and more accessible to 
rural landholders than the overarching political framework of the duchy of Guelders. 
Seigneurial communities associated justice and power first and foremost with physical 
structures that were close at hand. In seigneuries, this was the lord’s fortified residence, 
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often a castle, which also served as a base of operations for his legal personnel. This building 
loomed over the seigneurial village, and residents frequently passed it in their daily lives. In 
Guelders, most lords were furthermore entitled to elect the parish priest, thereby also 
forging a link with the local church edifice – arguably the cornerstone of social interactions 
in the countryside. Some lords and ladies, like those of Batenburg, even had the authority to 
mint their own coins. These gave even more ‘currency’ to the lords’ authority; especially 
because the low denomination of the coins of Batenburg suggests people used them on a 
frequent basis.66  
These tangible elements of seigneurial authority left a stronger imprint on local 
populations than the remote princely institutions. To be sure, the reeves and especially the 
local bailiffs (schouten or richters) of the princes of Guelders were usually nearer at hand, 
and therefore more familiar to subjects, than the ruler’s own court. But their authority was 
not symbolically buttressed by a towering structure such as a castle. Also, the wider radius 
of their jurisdictions – even of the bailiffs, whose juridical zones could encompass half of an 
entire shire – posed practical obstacles to local residents. People who belonged to the 
jurisdiction of the court of Kesteren, for example, could only redeem debts on their 
properties by submitting a formal request at the residence of the bailiff (schout) in that 
village. If they lived towards the outer bounds of the shire (e.g. in Dodewaard, Echteld), this 
meant that they had to travel for several hours to file for such a debt redemption.67 As we 
have seen, seigneurial jurisdictions tended to be more limited in their geographic scope. 
Their inhabitants will consequently have encountered fewer problems in this regard. 
 Through its bottom-up legitimacy and familiarity, the seigneurie became a fulcrum of 
local knowledge, thereby supporting Guelders’s political system in general. Seigneurial 
officers were well-versed in the daily affairs of their village because they were recruited 
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locally. Surviving legislations of lordships dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
reveal that the position of alderman (schepen) was not reserved for village elites but was 
accessible to men with medium-sized landholdings. What is more, the statutes dictated that 
the aldermen had to hail from the local community.68 In this regard, seigneurial legislations 
mirrored privileges secured by the cities and nobility of Guelders in the fifteenth century, 
which stipulated that all ducal reeves had to be born in the duchy.69 Yet, as mentioned 
above, these reeves and even the princely bailiffs had to oversee the affairs of several 
villages all at once. The officers of the seigneurie, by contrast, were solely charged with 
matters that concerned their own locality. Therefore, they were well-equipped to deal with 
everyday matters; certainly not less so than princely agents in non-seigneurial communities 
were. This inclusivity of local offices remained an integral part of Guelders’s polycentric 
political system until well into the early modern era. During the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, no less than 45 per cent of male heads of household in the seigneuries of 
Bommelerwaard had taken up a local office at one time during their lifetime. And, by this 
later period, even a small landholding was sufficient to be eligible for office.70  
 One could even hypothesise that the contractual relationship between lord and 
subjects made the governance over non-daily affairs more effective in seigneuries than in 
non-seigneurial villages. A good example is criminal justice. The infrequent need for criminal 
prosecutions within a single seigneurie – serious crimes were no everyday occurrence – 
might suggest that ducal officers in charge of a wider area also had more relevant 
experience in this regard. Yet ducal agents were not as versed in local custom as were 
officers sourced from the villages themselves. Take the example of the non-seigneurial 
villages of Brummen, Oosterbeek, Rheden and Velp in the shire of Veluwezoom. In an 
apparently inclusive legal ritual, each village had to send their own representatives 
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whenever the ducal bailiff (richter) executed criminals from any of these communities. 
Indeed, the delegates from Oosterbeek were literal ‘stake-holders’, charged with keeping in 
place the wooden poles of the gallows.71 However, the bailiff faced practical difficulties in 
getting the villages to participate. Because he was unfamiliar with the idiosyncrasies of local 
custom, the villagers were able to evade their duties and stall the legal process.72 Although 
lords did not necessarily have superior knowledge of the relevant customs either, their local 
representatives – who had a smaller area of jurisdiction than the princely bailiff – did. So, 
when the Habsburg administration requested information about the details of criminal 
litigation in the seigneuries of Guelders in 1569, the most detailed testimonies came from 
local alderman and other seigneurial officers.73  
 
IV. The seigneurie from the perspective of princely and urban administrations 
Localised authority in seigneuries has an understandable appeal from the perspectives of 
lords and ladies who derived their authority from it. To some extent, the same applies to the 
bottom-up perspective of countryfolk; in Guelders, but probably throughout the Low 
Countries, as Netherlandish village communities had their own voice in local politics from 
around 1300.74 But what of princely administrations: were they simply incapable of 
centralisation or were there perhaps specific benefits to a polycentric system? Earlier 
interpretations of state formation in Guelders can best be summed up by the statement 
that ‘a tendency to centralization was doomed to fail’.75 However, the idea that 
centralisation was a key ambition of princely governments is a questionable assumption. In 
fact, a polycentric system that included seigneuries had advantages in its own right to the 
prince and his officials. A common problem of pre-modern states was that they lacked the 
administrative clout to govern without the cooperation of local powerbrokers and 
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organisations (e.g. parish priests, guilds).76 Outsourcing certain aspects of governance to the 
seigneurie may have offered a practical solution to this problem, because lords and their 
officers had the ‘boots on the ground’ that the prince (and, to some extent, his officers) 
lacked. Beyond this practical consideration, the princes of Guelders may simply have 
considered the seigneurie a legitimate basis of power. 
 In fact, the prince of Guelders will have had to accept the legitimacy of the 
seigneurial system, because he was a lord himself and derived his own authority from the 
same ideological basis.77 Nonetheless, the princes of Guelders were able to legitimate their 
superior position by explicitly presenting themselves as primus inter pares, the ‘prince’ or 
‘first among all other lords’ of Guelders. This self-fashioning can be clearly observed in the 
feudal records produced during the reign of Duke Charles of Burgundy (1473-1477). As part 
of his take-over in Guelders, the Burgundian duke ordered an overview of the financial 
potential of his various fief-holders.78 In the draft version of this ledger, the duke’s title 
originally read ‘highly revered lord’ but the words have been crossed out and replaced by 
‘very high and very powerful prince’ (my emphasis). The latter title was also kept in the final 
version.79 The example exposes the deliberate self-fashioning of this ‘prince’ of Guelders in 
relation to the lords of his duchy. 
When the princes of Guelders did interfere in the seigneurial framework, the usual 
effect was not a corrosion of seigneurial authority but rather its consolidation. But then, the 
seigneurie could provide practical advantages to the state beyond the benefits of legitimacy. 
Duke Charles of Egmont (1492-1538), for one, appears to have consciously exploited the 
military and financial assets of Guelders’s seigneurial system. Continuously faced with 
external threats to his reign, this duke rewarded loyal supporters with high lordships or 
expanded the purviews of their existing jurisdictions. This may have helped to redirect the 
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proliferous seigneurial warfare that marked his reign to serve the duke’s interests.80 A clear 
example of Duke Charles of Egmont’s seigneurial policy was the lordship of Zoelen in the 
shire of Neder-Betuwe. Because Lord Willem van Rossem had ‘stood by, aided and served 
[Duke Charles] until the very end’, in 1506, the duke awarded him ‘the parish of Zoelen with 
high lordship, where he and his forefathers had held day-to-day lordship’.81 By outsourcing 
seigneurial justice to his allies in this way, the duke concomitantly sub-contracted loyal lords 
to maintain the military strongholds that most high lordships possessed. Through the so-
called ‘law of opening’ (ius aperturae), meanwhile, these lords could be forced to open their 
castle to princely troops, should the need arise. In any case, even the high lordships of 
Guelders were obliged to answer the princes’ military summonses (clockenslach ind 
dijenst).82  
The financial component of this strategy was straightforward: the burden of 
maintaining (seigneurial) fortifications fell to the lord. This alleviated the state’s costs of 
military upkeep, while simultaneously saving on the expenses of local criminal litigation.83 
Take the example of the castle of Roozendaal in the Quarter of Arnhem. Duke Charles of 
Egmont first granted this castle with high justice to his officer Gerrit van Scherpenzeel in 
1516; again, as a reward ‘for repeated loyal service’. Now, Van Scherpenzeel was entitled to 
Roozendaal’s seigneurial revenues, but also had the responsibility to rebuild the decrepit 
stronghold. When Gerrit died in 1536, Duke Charles allowed Van Scherpenzeel’s son Willem 
to inherit the lordship on two conditions. The first was that the fief could only stay within 
the family through Van Scherpenzeel’s direct descendants (in linea descendenti). This might 
have ensured its swift return to the dukes of Guelders, were it not for the fecundity of the 
Van Scherpenzeel family.84 But another precondition was that the prince gained control of 
the castle of Coldenhove (Kaldenhoeve) in return. This was a stronghold that Willem had 
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previously bought from none other than the duke himself, and that he had ‘thoroughly 
improved’ in the meantime.85 In a similar vein, the duke enfeoffed another member of the 
Van Scherpenzeel family with the toponymic Scherpenzeel estate in 1522, ‘to improve the 
fief’, which in this case meant to turn its burnt-down forest into proper sowing land.86 This 
policy with regards to seigneurial fortifications and lands thereby served the duke’s financial 
as well as his military interests. 
 Of course, this does not mean that certain princes of Guelders did not aspire to 
centralisation and greater control over their territory. Especially the Burgundian (1473-
1477) and Habsburg (1543-1581) reigns were marked by efforts to streamline the political 
institutional framework of Guelders. But these foreign administrations consistently 
recognised the need to take the duchy’s seigneuries as a starting point. What is more, their 
attempts to partially reform the seigneurial framework were mostly unsuccessful. The 
princely perspective was marked by a tension in this regard: on the surface, the seigneurie 
was a recognisable institution of governance, but underneath this basic familiarity hid 
distinctly heterogeneous local customs that required the involvement of those in the know. 
Thus, Charles of Burgundy’s feudal overview of 1473 served both to gauge the military and 
fiscal potential of Guelders, but also to understand the duchy’s governmental structure. As 
the duke’s officers converted the fiefs’ local taxes from diverse levies in kind into a single 
currency, so, too, did they translate the seigneurial terminology from Middle-Dutch into 
French. In practice, however, the seigneuries of Guelders were by no means uniform units 
of governance, and the princes knew it. This is exemplified by the Habsburg rulers’ attempt 
to integrate the criminal justice system of their Netherlandish principalities in 1569. 
Recognising the importance of seigneurial governance in Guelders, the ducal administrators 
first ordered an overview of the duchy’s lordships with high (i.e. criminal) justice. But they 
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subsequently used this overview to request information about the finer details of local 
criminal procedure from the relevant parties in situ: that is, the lords and their officers.87 
The Habsburg administration notably failed to merge these various customs into the same 
institutional mould of their other territories. In fact, local aversion to this top-down 
standardisation attempt would be one of the reasons why the northern provinces – 
including the greater part of Guelders – sought independence from the Habsburg Low 
Countries in the 1580s.88 
This notwithstanding, the seigneuries of Guelders may have indirectly contributed to 
the integration of the principality’s legal system; namely, through the codification of local 
legal custom. Only a handful of these legal codes have survived for Guelders. The seigneurial 
legislations that remain, however, were clearly modelled on similar laws designed by the 
princely government at the shire level.89 Despite their juridical independence, therefore, 
seigneuries could function as a basis for legal integration, since their inhabitants were more 
or less subject to the same laws as their countrymen who were answerable to the duke’s 
reeves. Moreover, much like their ducal equivalents at the shire level, these proto-
constitutional documents (called Landbrieven) were a product of negotiations between the 
lord and his subjects. Because of this, they contributed to a consensual basis of local 
governance (these were the documents that stipulated among other things that offices 
within the lordship could only be filled by local residents).90  
The broader implication is that in terms of legislature as well, the seigneurie can be 
seen as a conduit of governance between the prince and the local community – perhaps 
even as a mouthpiece for the state. Guelders was not altogether exceptional in this regard: 
in the county of Holland, for example, local village courts had also come to form an 
integrated legal framework by the sixteenth century, despite the pronounced 
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decentralisation of the Dutch political system.91 In Guelders, a criminal case of 1570 
suggests that, by that time, even legally independent lordships were already integrated into 
an overarching – if ad hoc – legal framework. In October of that year, a man living in the 
seigneurial jurisdiction of Waardenburg stole two pigs off a dyke in the lordship of Dalem. 
The lady of Waardenburg had the culprit captured, but her agents subsequently transported 
him to the ducal Court in Arnhem, and it was there that he was prosecuted. The lord of 
Dalem – whose seigneurie incidentally had its own Landbrief – remained uninvolved in the 
entire affair. This case suggests that by the later sixteenth century at least, the 
independence of seigneurial law courts in Guelders was perhaps more discursive than 
practical. At the same time, the episode emphasises how seigneuries possessed the local 
clout that the princely administration often lacked. Thus, the seigneuries and princely 
institutions of this Netherlandish region formed a more or less harmonious system, similar 
to the integration of aristocratic and royal power previous studies have unveiled for 
different regions in the British Isles.92 
It is worth pausing for a second here and consider how Guelders’s sub-regional 
disparity in the spread of seigneuries affected this legal integration (Table 1). In a sense, the 
smaller number of seigneurial courts in the Quarter of Arnhem could have facilitated a more 
uniform legal framework in this area than in lordship-dense Nijmegen. Juridical authority 
over Arnhem’s countryside was chiefly divided between the ducal seneschal (drost) of 
Veluwe and the bailiff (richter) of Veluwezoom. The rural and urban judiciaries in this 
Quarter also had recourse to a total of only three appellate courts; respectively, in the cities 
of Arnhem and Zutphen, and at the central ducal court of Engelanderholt. This degree of 
legal centralisation coincided with the dukes’ preference for permanent residence in the 
Quarter’s capital city of Arnhem from the second half of the fifteenth century onwards.93 In 
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the Quarter of Nijmegen, by contrast, such judicial ties were more diverse. For one thing, 
the more numerous shires each had their own ducal reeve who passed sentence in a 
separate tribunal. For another, Nijmegen’s seigneurial law courts were entangled with 
various appellate courts. In some lordships, such as Ressen in the shire of Over-Betuwe, the 
court of appeals even lay outside Guelders altogether.94 These juridical offshoots potentially 
made for a ‘leakier’ state in the Quarter of Nijmegen. From what we have seen, however, 
the evidence can also be interpreted in the opposite way: through copying state legislation, 
the lordships in the Quarter of Nijmegen potentially formed a basis for the area’s 
integration into the duchy’s political system. At the same time, the bailiff of Veluwezoom 
apparently encountered problems in the administration of criminal justice because he had 
to juggle the local customs of various localities all at once (see above). 
This ambiguity also applies to the role of seigneuries in the principality’s fiscal 
integration. A recent study has shown that late medieval Guelders differed from other 
regions in the Low Countries in the organisation of its tax system. Where these other 
Netherlandish principalities (Brabant, Holland, Luxembourg) left the apportioning of fiscal 
duties up to the regional authorities (towns, shires), the tax burdens of the people of 
Guelders – based on individual wealth – were recorded at a central level.95 This could mean 
that the subregional differences in seigneurial landscape had little impact on Guelders’s 
fiscal integration. That said, the actual procedure of tax collection still fell to the prince’s 
regional officers, who may have faced more practical obstacles to executing their tasks in a 
region with a marked seigneurial presence, such as the Quarter of Nijmegen, than in areas 
where princely authority was more absolute. On the whole, however, the fiscal contribution 
of the Quarter of Nijmegen does not appear to have suffered from the relative abundance 
of seigneurial jurisdictions in this subregion. In 1570, a duchy-wide tax acceded to the 
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government of King Philip II generated more revenue in the Nijmegen area than in the 
Quarter of Arnhem (respectively £179,924 and £125,222 Flemish groats). To be sure, the 
fiscal contribution of Nijmegen’s lordships was lower than that of its non-seigneurial villages 
and towns (40 per cent), even though seigneurial communities slightly outweighed other 
communities in their number (Table 3). But this picture is sloped by the greater population 
numbers and concentrations of wealth in certain towns and larger non-seigneurial villages. 
As we have seen, lordships such as Poederoijen only counted around 200 people at this 
time, and this is reflected in their smaller contributions (£568 1s 3d Flemish groats over 4 
years).96 Furthermore, the way in which this ‘central’ fiscal record is structured, suggests 
that lords and seigneurial officers took up the task of local tax collection in their seigneuries: 
localities that shared the same lord were recorded in a single entry – even when they did 
not border on each other, such as Oyen and Dieden.97 This implies that the levying of taxes 
was effectively outsourced to seigneurial governments as well. 
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
In a similar vein, seigneuries may have benefited the political integration of 
Guelders. Part of the reason for this is that lordships with high justice were represented by 
their lords at the Estates assemblies. Much like the prince and seigneurial communities, the 
cities and towns therefore recognised the political legitimacy of the seigneurie. As a 
consequence, these rural localities were drawn into duchy-wide politics by proxy, even if 
they did not have a direct voice. So they acquired a formal political status alongside the 
towns of Guelders, which had to take their position into consideration. The high lordships of 
Guelders could thereby operate on a similar footing to the smaller towns – not counting 
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those exceptional seigneuries that were actual towns, like Batenburg and Gendt.98 Villages 
without a lord lacked this kind of representation. The non-seigneurial countryside was 
certainly not without political influence, as its noble fief-holders were eligible for 
membership of the Estate of the Knighthood. But the latter were not nominal 
intermediaries for a local community. In other words, they did not operate on the same 
contractual basis as their seigneurial fellows who were identified by their lordship at the 
assemblies. What is more, through the intercession of lords, seigneurial jurisdictions inside 
the territorial bounds of Guelders but without feudal ties to the prince were nonetheless 
represented at the Estates meetings. This becomes more significant when one realises that 
around half of the high lordships in the Quarter of Nijmegen were either fiefs of 
neighbouring princes or were juridically independent allods. Through their seigneurial 
status, the interests of these legally ambivalent localities were still looked after at the 
Estates assemblies.99 Put the other way around, their seigneurial status drew these places 
into the framework of Guelders’s state. 
 
V. Conclusion: seeing like a seigneurie? 
This article has suggested that the persistence of seigneurial governance was not necessarily 
counterproductive to state formation in the late medieval Low Countries and, by extension, 
in the principalities of the German Empire more generally. This conclusion is borne out by 
empirical evidence for the Netherlandish principality of Guelders. The analysis has expressly 
departed from the still dominant narrative of a progressive centralisation of state power 
and the requisite decline of ‘private’ courts of justice by the end of the middle ages. The 
evidence has shown that, far from declining, the number of seigneuries and their associated 
tribunals remained constant in Guelders between 1325 and 1570. These jurisdictions were 
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ruled by seigneurial families with a degree of long-term dynastic continuity similar to other 
European regions where seigneurial institutions remained ingrained in the political system 
(e.g. the Basse-Auvergne in France). What is more, the number of lordships charged with 
criminal justice – which supposedly undercut the state’s monopoly on licit violence – 
actually increased between the end of the fifteenth and the middle of the sixteenth century.  
Contrary to the centralisation thesis, I have argued that this persistence of 
seigneurial justice was not so much a consequence of elite resistance or a failure on the part 
of the state to siphon off the power of regional elites. Rather, it was an effect of active 
collaboration between the princely administration and the lords of Guelders, based on a 
shared interest in the legitimisation and facilitation of governance. So, the foreign Duke 
Charles the Bold explicitly positioned himself as the ‘principal’ lord (prinche) of Guelders as a 
means to legitimate his authority when he became duke of Guelders in 1473. Likewise, Duke 
Charles of Egmont (1492-1538) pursued a veritable policy of expanding seigneurial 
jurisdictions in the early 1500s because this served the practical interests (financial, military) 
of the state. The lords themselves, meanwhile, derived exalted social status from exercising 
justice in their own seigneurial courts. This seigneurial status also granted them access to 
duchy-wide politics through participation at the assemblies of the Three Estates. To the 
inhabitants of Guelders, seigneurial governance enabled a direct involvement in local 
politics; partly through their contractual relationship with the lord, based on the 
contemporary ideology of Good Lordship; partly because of the familiarity of seigneurial 
institutions, buildings, and personnel; and ultimately because political offices were within 
reach even of local landowners with a mere medium-sized holding (and pointedly not to 
outsiders). This bottom-up consent to seigneurial governance fed back positively into the 
legitimacy of the overarching political system, thereby benefiting the state. 
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The findings of this study therefore tie in closely with a growing body of scholarship 
that emphasises the mutualistic relationship and institutional integration of medieval state 
administrations and their elites. Firstly, the Netherlandish case of Guelders is reminiscent of 
the enduring juridical, military, and political relevance of seigneurial institutions in the late 
medieval Basse-Auvergne as demonstrated by Pierre Charbonnier in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Secondly, the seigneurial system of Guelders between 1325 and 1570 bears close 
resemblance to that of Scotland in the high middle ages. As Alice Taylor has recently argued, 
in the kingdom of Scots, ‘the institutions of royal government developed with and alongside 
the jurisdictional power that kings expected aristocrats to exercise in their own lands’.100 
This is very similar to Guelders’s stability of seigneurial governance alongside the evolving 
princely institutions.  
Scotland and Guelders show a further parallel in the sense that their political 
developments have largely been explained in connection with the influence of external 
governmental structures: what is called ‘Anglicization’ in the Scottish case, or 
‘Burgundisation’ (Bourgondisering) in the case of Guelders.101 This confrontation between 
external and internal systems of governance recalls parts of the analysis in James C. Scott’s 
1998 book Seeing like a State. According to Scott, the pitfall of modern states lies in their 
attempt to forcefully make local societies ‘legible’; that is to say, to superimpose 
standardised grids (e.g. of taxation, military conscription) throughout their territories. Scott 
considers these schemes of the modern state doomed to failure because they ignore the 
fundamental localised ‘knowledge that can only come from practical experience’.102 As we 
have seen, certain princely administrations of late medieval Guelders also tried to 
standardise the diverse local practices in their principality. Most prominently, Charles the 
Bold attempted to streamline Guelders’s feudal administration in the late fifteenth century, 
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while his Habsburg followers strove for a homogenous criminal system during their reign 
(1543-1581). In keeping with Scott’s thesis, however, these pre-modern efforts of the state 
were ultimately ineffective.103  
This is where the seigneurie fulfilled a pivotal role in the operation of principalities as 
late medieval versions of states. As I have argued, the seigneurie functioned like an 
interface between the top-down perspective of the princely administration and the bottom-
up viewpoint of local communities. Virtually a pan-European institution, the seigneurie was 
superficially familiar (or legible) to late medieval princely administrations. So, 
notwithstanding some minor attempts at standardisation, the princes of Guelders 
predominantly followed the path of least resistance and outsourced governmental tasks to 
the level of the seigneurie. This level of governance was both familiar and legitimate, or 
legible, in the eyes of local populations. Equally important, the lord and his locally sourced 
officers were perhaps in a better position to understand (or ‘read’) the specific 
circumstances and customs of these local societies than princely agents with a wider 
geographic remit. By outsourcing aspects of governance to the seigneurie, the late medieval 
state of Guelders thus avoided the ‘modern mistake’ of ignoring the fundamental expertise 
of the local populace. As suggested by a recent study, this inclusivity of seigneurial politics 
only increased in Guelders during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.104 
To be clear, I by no means wish to suggest that late medieval lordship and its 
associated institutions were somehow ‘right’, or even efficient, forms of government.105 I 
have merely entertained the notion that seigneurial institutions of governance may have 
been ‘optimal’ under the specific historic circumstances in which they persisted for the 
better part of two-and-a-half centuries: a consequence of the convergence of interests 
between, and practical restrictions of, the most important political stakeholders.  Together, 
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the princes, seigneuries, non-seigneurial localities, and towns of late medieval Guelders 
formed a political system that shows clear signs of institutional integration between the 
early fourteenth and later sixteenth century. Insofar as we can label this form of 
government a state, it was certainly a different kind of state than envisioned by the disciples 
of Max Weber.  
Thus, as historians re-examine pre-modern states with an eye to this kind of 
historical particularism, the ‘ideal type’ state based on centralisation and the monopoly of 
force increasingly turns out to be atypical. It might therefore be fruitful for future studies of 
pre-modern state formation to start from a default hypothesis based on the interrelation of 
state and elite power, rather than one based on opposition between centralisation and 
‘private’ forms of power. Although long-term quantifications of seigneurial power may not 
always be possible, it is certainly feasible to broaden the analytical viewpoint as I have tried 
to do here, viewing governance as much through the eyes of lords and seigneurial 






Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1  
Quantitative survey of seigneuries in Guelders (14th-16th century) 
 
Shire c. 1325 c. 1475 c. 1540 c. 1570 No of parishes 
(>1520) a 
Quarter of Nijmegen  
Bommelerwaard 4 (3)b 12 (4) 11 (4) 11 (4) 15 
Imperial Nijmegen 4 (1) 8 (5) 8 (5) 8 (6) 14 
Meuse & Waal 6 (1 ⅓) 9 (3) 8 (4) 9 (6) 20 
Neder-Betuwe 5 (2) 8 (4) 7 (5) 7 (4) 17 
Over-Betuwe 9 (2) 10 (9) 12 (12) 12 (12) 27 
Tielerwaard 4 (0) 11 (1) 10 (2) 9 (2) 23 
Quarter total 32 (9 ⅓) 58 (28) 56 (32) 56 (34) 116 
Quarter of Arnhem  
Veluwe 3 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0) 4 (0) 32 
Veluwezoom 2 (1) 3 (1) 5 (3) 5 (3) 11 
Quarter total 5 (1) 7 (1) 9 (3) 9 (3) 43 
a These figures do not include the urban parishes. Based on: M. G. Spiertz & R. W. A. Megens, Gids voor de 
studie van reformatie en katholieke herleving in Gelderland 1520-1620 (Utrecht, 1986). 
b The first number in each column denotes the total number of seigneuries in the shire, the second number 
(between brackets) signifies which of that number were lordships with high (criminal) justice. 
Sources: GA 0002, Nos. 1A, 2B, 4D, 12, 14G, 16, 22, 102, 115, 116; 0124, Nos. 983/14, 2280, 4346, 4923/49; 
0243, Nos. 947, 1918; 0379, No. 557; 0632, No. 170; 0609, No. 744; 0583, No. 77; 0397, No. 3; 0375, No. 2; 
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0392, No. 8; 0426, No. 1; 0525, No. 160; 0522, Nos. 81, 193; 0383, No. 61; 0430, Nos. 107, 141; 0520, No. 
288/11; 0382, Nos. 1, 2, 70; 0533, No. 3; 0370, Nos. 100, 6002; 0012, Nos. 368, 591, 2198; 0510, No. 104; 
1172, Nos. 619, 620, 622A, 685/A, 1052; 0390, Nos. 2, 12; 0376, No. 38; 0448, No. 1; 0396, No. 5; 0447, No. 
200; ’s-Hertogenbosch, Brabants Historisch Informatie Centrum 286, No. 468; AHB 0214, Nos. 270, 474, 
510, 1113, 3286, 4948, 5668, 5770, 6112; The Hague, Nationaal Archief 3.19.11, Nos. 2.1, 2.2; 3.19.02, Nos. 
93, 102; 3.01.01, No. 69; Utrecht, Utrechts Archief 1240, Nos. 10, 12, 17; 85-1, No. 376; RDO_OA, No. 
1446.0; 218-1, No. 560; P. N. van Doorninck and J. S. van Veen eds., Acten betreffende Gelre en Zutphen, 
1107-1415 (Haarlem, 1908); van Doorninck, Het oudste leenactenboek; D. Graswinckel, ’Hulhuizen’, BM 
Gelre, 27 (1927), 1-29, Appendices; Th. Ilgen ed., Quellen zur inneren Geschichte der rhenischen Territorien: 
Herzogtum Kleve, 2 Vols. (Bonn, 1921-1925); Theod. Jos. Lacomblet ed., Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte 
des Niederrheins, etc., Vols. 3-4 (Düsseldorf, 1853-1858); Nijhoff, Gedenkwaardigheden, Vols. 1-6; Sloet and 
van Veen, Register op de Leenaktenboeken, Het Kwartier van Arnhem; Het Kwartier van Nymegen. 
 
 
Table 2.a  
Evolution of seigneurial families (Quarters of Nijmegen and Arnhem) 
 c. 1325 c. 1475 c. 1540 c. 1570 
No of identified families 31 34 32 33 
No of seigneuries 38 47 58 65 
Average no of seigneuries/family 1.23 1.38 1.81 1.97 












Table 2.b  
Dynastic continuity of seigneurial families (Quarters of Nijmegen and Arnhem) 
Poll moments 1325-1475  
(n = 28) 
1475-1540  
(n = 49) 
1540-1570  
(n = 51) 
Dynastic continuity 21% 47% 71% 
With high justice  17% 45% 67% 
Without high justice 30% 48% 75% 
Long term 1325-1475  




(n = 30)  
Dynastic continuity 21% 44% 10% 
With high justice  17% 46% 5% 
Without high justice 30% 42% 25% 
n = number of lordships with known seigneurial families for both sample years 





Table 3  
Fiscal contributions of localities (urban and rural) in 1570  
Based on four-year totals (raised in £ of 40 Flemish groats) 
Quarter of Nijmegena 









Bommelerwaard 12 6 44% 56% 
Imperial Nijmegen 19 11 57% 43% 
Neder-Betuwe 7 12 15% 85% 
Over-Betuwe 14 14 29% 71% 
Tielerwaard 12 15 46% 54% 
 64 (52%) 58 (48%) 40% 60% 
Quarter of Arnhem 
Total: £125,222 
    
Veluwec 4 (18%) 18 (82%) 7% 93% 
a The shire of Meuse & Waal is not listed separately in the source. 
b These are the localities as distinguished in the source. 
c The source does not distinguish between different shires for the Quarter of Arnhem. 
Source: GA, Handschriften Rijksarchief in Gelderland, No. 409 (‘Verclaringhe van de taxe oft quoten der 




Figure 1 Guelders and its seigneuries, 1325-1570 (Quarters of Arnhem and Nijmegen) 
Sources: see Table 1. Map by Hans Blomme, Ghent University. 
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